Summary of remarks by Paul Michael Wihbey, Strategic Fellow, IASPS, on "Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East", ASAM Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies Symposium, Ankara, Turkey, November 28, 2000.           

• Moderator: Dr. Hasan Koni, Ankara University
• Co-Panelist: Dr. Ali Ihsan Bagis, Hacettepe University

Introduction:

In the Middle East, water is redefining interstate relations.  Mutual reliance on dwindling resources has spurred escalating conflicts along the major waterways of the region.  Without viable agreement, the Middle East, historically unstable and factional, stands poised to deteriorate into regional infighting over water allocation and accessibility.  Arresting this drift will necessitate implementing a strategic architecture that facilitates access to and guarantees distribution of, this diminishing resource.  The integration of water into current regional strategic cooperation initiatives may be the only method by which to reverse the tide of escalating water conflicts.  For Middle Eastern nations, many already treading the razor's edge of conflict, water is becoming a catalyst for confrontation -- an issue of national security and foreign policy as well as domestic stability.  In the Middle East, water resources are plummeting.  While representing 5% of the total world population, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region contains only 0.9% of global water resources.  Influenced by declining availability and reductions in overall quality, crisis zones have begun to emerge along the major rivers of the region.  Evolving conflicts -- between Turkey and Syria over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; in the Jordan River Basin between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan; among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the Nile River; and within Saudi Arabia -- are manifestations of water's growing role as a strategic and political force.  Water's strategic significance is not confined to elite policy planners, but is already being addressed by scholars, politicians and journalists.  To take a recent example, Duried Mahasneh wrote in the Amman Jordan Times on September 6, 2000, "The two examples of relations in water projects with Syria and Libya do emphasize the importance of water in our foreign policy.  We, unlike most other countries, have to deal with all surrounding neighbours including Israel to secure our rightful share of water.  Water being one of the most important pillars of our national security deserves more attention and care.  the water issue deserves the same level of support King Abdullah gave to issues like the economy or Aqaba.  Proper management of water resources doesn't alienate donors, whether foreign or Arab, while also ensuring we preserve our rights." 

National and Transnational Conditions:

(1) Jordan/Israel/Palestinian Authority -- Between Jordan and Israel, water resource issues are reaching a fever pitch.  Despite the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Treaty -- which established comprehensive guidelines regulating the distribution, preservation and availability of water from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers -- conflicts over water have risen to the forefront of relations between the two countries.  Jordan, fed only by underground sources and the Jordan River, has experienced an escalating water deficit -- one that is expected to reach 250 million cubic meters (nearly one-third of current annual consumption) by 2010.  At the same time, Israel -- currently utilizing almost all available water from its national Water System (consisting of the West Bank Mountain Aquifer, the Coastal Aquifer and the Lake Kinneret/Sea of Galilee Basin) -- has been forced to resort to overexploitation of available resources for expanding agricultural and industrial ventures.  Israel halved its annual allocation of 2 billion cubic feet of water to Jordan in March 1999.  Jordan, hit hard and lacking adequate desalinization capabilities, has in turn found itself unable to sustain current levels of consumption, declaring drought conditions and mandating water rationing in May 1999.  The historically troubled relations between Israel and the Palestinians have also been magnified by water.  Mutual reliance on the West Bank Mountain Aquifer, which rests atop the demarcating border of the disputed West Bank territory (and currently provides one-third of Israel's water supply and 80% of Palestinian consumption), has created friction between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  Despite being the most important source of long-term water for Israel, use of the Aquifer -- as a result of its uncertain status -- has not been fully exploited.  Israeli officials, while cognizant of the growing water crisis, fear Israeli dependency on potentially Palestinian-controlled water sources.

(2) Israel/Syria -- From the start, water has been a central theme in the Israeli-Syrian dialogue.  suffering from over-irrigation, excessive pollution and a growing population, Syria has viewed negotiations with Israel as a means by which to alleviate its chronic water problem.  Hence Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's insistence on an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 border.  Aside from the political victory that such an action would signal, the demand is also an effort to gain control over water sources on the Golan Heights.  An Israeli withdrawal would give Syria access to the eastern half of the Jordan River headwaters and bring it to the shores of Lake Kinneret.  This would make Mr. Assad a partner to Israeli water, giving Syria legal rights to use Lake Kinneret as it deems fit, including piping fresh water back to Damascus.  In the Syrian view, water is not only a commodity, but also a strategic resource and an essential tool by which to alter the balance of power equation in its favor.  Syria understands that water can be the instrument by which to gain an economic and strategic advantage over Israel.  Thus, by targeting Israel's most vulnerable strategic asset, its dwindling water supplies, Syria has sought to position itself to profoundly influence Israel's bargaining posture over borders and security.  This, more than any other factor, may be the reason why Israel has not committed itself to a written agreement regarding a redeployment to the June 4, 1967 line.  To do so would be to signal an irrevocable surrender of both the Jordan River and the Kinneret/Sea of Galilee.  The ensconcement of Syria on the Golan would allow Damascus not only to virtually dictate terms to Jerusalem, but exert influence over Amman and create a rift in the Israeli-Turkish military partnership as well.

(3) Israel/Turkey -- Prompted by recent reports by Israel's water company Mekorot and the Water Commissioner's Office that the levels of Lake Kinneret and the mountain aquifer were reaching record lows risking the possibility of the salinization of these reservoirs, Israel is seeking a deal with Turkey that would allow for up to 45 million cubic meters of water a year to be transported to Israel in 250,000 ton tankers.  Should a deal be concluded, Turkish water could be offloaded in Ashkelon in 10-12 months time and piped into Israel's national water system.  The fact that the Israeli National Security council has now been charged to examine the water crisis and make necessary recommendation highlights two important issues for security planning:

(a) Israel's antiquated and irresponsible policy of providing subsidies to its agricultural sector, which currently receives in excess of 70% of Israel's annual water while providing less than 3% of its GNP, has forced the country to overexploit its available resources (according to Mekorot projected water deficit for 2001 close to 120 million cu.m. against an annual consumption of approximately 1.8 billion cu.m.).  The results have been disastrous -- according to Mekorot, the water situation in Israel could worsen in 2001, even taking into account a 50% cutback in the quotas of fresh water provided to Israeli farmers.  At the beginning of November, the Israeli water company announced a decision to stop drawing water from Lake Kinneret, except on the weekends, in an effort to prevent its level from reaching the new red line mark before the onset of winter rains.  The state of underground reservoirs is also bad, however, with the level in parts of the Mountain Aquifer already close to the minimum mark while in some sectors of the  Coastal Aquifer it is below the red line as a result of years of overpumping.  The gravity of this crisis led Environment Minister Dalia Itzik to warn in July that "within three or four months, and especially next year, if there is drought this winter we might have no water in the taps, but what there is will be undrinkable."  In attempts to combat the country's deepening water crisis, Israeli policymakers have begun to explore drastic measures for water procurement, foremost among them the purchase of water from Turkey.  But Jerusalem, failing to appreciate the importance of this issue in its relations with Ankara, has been slow to finalize the importation of Turkish water. 

(b) A water crisis in Israel, will surely mean a similar or worse situation in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan.  The social and political ramifications of prolonged water shortage in a period of drought in the PA and Jordan ought not to be underestimated.  The fact that Israel's principal reservoirs are now threatened with salination underscores the failure of Israeli authorities to treat the water issue in strategic and regional terms.  Such an oversight has contributed significantly to Israel's vulnerability in recent negotiations with Syria thereby allowing Syria to try to outmaneuver Israel on the eventual control of the headwaters of Jordan River which in turn feeds the Kinneret which supplies as much as 40% of Israel's fresh water.

Conclusion:

Turkish authorities have made it clear that they were willing to sell their surplus water to Israel most likely at a cost approximating that of desalinated water.  Although initial Israeli assessments tend to view the importation of Turkish water as a temporary stop-gap measure, Israeli planners would do well to take a longer-term view of this new dimension in the bilateral relationship to consider a regional water grid of overland pipelines, pumping stations and storage facilities that would supplement the tanker system.  Such an approach would call for a new regional alliance system anchored on Turkish capabilities for water exportation, the end of the Baathist regime in Syria and its role as the blocking mechanism in Levant regional development, and Lebanon's potential as a water supplier (annual precipitation is over 9 billion cu.m).  Efforts to normalize regional tensions over water will hinge upon the equitable distribution of available resources and the creation of security frameworks to ensure their safety and stability.  Despite the volatility of Middle Eastern politics, the beginnings of such frameworks are already in place.  Turkey and Israel have exhibited burgeoning bilateral relations, Jordan and Israel have a comprehensive dialogue on political and military affairs strengthened by the signing of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Treaty.  These developing but fragile alliances could with the proper international support serve as the fulcrum for international stability in the manner similar to the foundations laid for the European Community by the Benelux agreement over coal supplies in the early 1950s.  Creating a solid political-military framework on water issues (perhaps through a Memorandum of Understanding similar to the one which laid the foundation for U.S.-Israeli strategic coordination in 1981) could initiate a broad range of collaborative ventures, such as: --creation of concrete military coordination, including mutual defense agreements over regional water supplies, among cooperating nations; --commencement of research and development efforts on the issue of regional water sharing, including multilateral plans for creation of a regional grid of interstate carrier systems; --establishment of a structure for regional information-sharing regarding  environmental conditions and technological breakthroughs.  Such efforts could include the construction of a Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian regional database to expedite centralized responses to emerging water conditions and changes. 

Recommendations:

(1) That the Government of Israel take an immediate decision to import Turkish water supplies in order to meet increasing demands and put an end to what maybe bureaucratic infighting seeking to control  commercial markets for water consumption in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.  Such a decision would help broaden Israel's relations with Turkey and possibly stop the unnecessary erosion of relations between the two countries that has recently been exemplified by the cancellation of joint naval maneuvers and the Turkish cancellation of several major arms purchases from Israel approximating $ US 5 billion.

(2) Establishment of a four-party governmental planning commission for regional water management and allocation to be composed of representatives from the United States, Jordan, Turkey and Israel.  Other participants such as Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus would be subject to certain political, economic, and security guidelines.