IASPS - News Behind the News

Georgia on His Mind
by Vladimir Socor

In an exercise of megaphone diplomacy, Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest associates are seeking American consent to Russian "anti-terrorist" military intervention in the pro-Western country of Georgia. The Kremlin apparently hopes to goad Washington into an "Iraq-for-Georgia" tradeoff: It's signaling that Russia might not seriously object to U.S. military action against Saddam Hussein some months down the road, if America tacitly condones a Russian military action in Georgia right now.

Leading the Moscow chorus for intervention in Georgia are presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov, Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov and foreign affairs committee chief Mikhail Margelov -- Mr. Putin's own teammates. Joining them for the purpose are some "usual suspects" among ultranationalists, such as the pet hardliner Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

They all are arguing that Russia has a "right" to intervene in Georgia -- just as the U.S. has in Afghanistan, Israel has on the West Bank, or India does in its own part of Kashmir -- against "international terrorism." They also cite President George W. Bush's recently unveiled preemption doctrine, in order to claim a right of Russian preemption in Georgia. Asserting such a "right" would, obviously, make it unnecessary for Moscow ever to substantiate its accusations that Georgia tolerates an international terrorist sanctuary on its territory.

There is, of course, not the slightest equivalency between the above situations and the one in Georgia. Implicitly underlining that point, on Aug. 1, the U.S. State Department issued a strong statement of support for Georgia's sovereignty and inviolability. Citing the Pentagon's Train-and-Equip program in Georgia -- which involves Green Berets already in the country -- the statement underscored that it is up to Georgia itself to conduct any anti-terrorist operations, if necessary, within its own territory. The same day, the commander of Georgia's border troops, Lieutenant-General Valery Chkheidze, just back from Washington, announced that the U.S. has allocated an additional $10 million for strengthening the protection of the Georgia-Russia border on the Chechen sector.

Moscow responded by hinting that it might oppose U.S. action in Iraq. The government's official newspaper, "Rossiiskaya Gazeta," expressed strong disappointment with the State Department's statement -- and with U.S. foreign policy generally. It complained that Washington is turning Georgia (with the latter's enthusiastic support) into a strategic U.S. outpost in the Caucasus.

The U.S. intends to "start a war in Iraq" unilaterally, just as it has acted before in other parts of the world, "without the international community's consent," this official mouthpiece editorialized. The paper went on caution Washington against "ignoring the interests of its friends and allies, whom it may need in the future." The article appeared designed to suggest that Moscow had expected a tradeoff over Georgia, and that it may continue to seek a quid-pro-quo for Russia's eventual acquiescence to U.S. operations in Iraq or elsewhere.

The Kremlin has been itching to reel Georgia back into its orbit for years. At present, Russia seems in a hurry to send its troops into Georgia before the October snowfalls block the Caucasus passes. Mr. Putin does have a shade of an excuse. Several hundred armed Chechen fighters -- along with several thousand Chechen women, children and elderly -- have found safe haven in a tiny, remote corner of Georgia, the Pankisi Gorge, which is home to Georgia's own small ethnic Chechen community. The Kremlin asserts that Pankisi serves as a supply channel to Chechen insurgents in Russian Chechnya, and as a base for "international terrorism."

These are grotesque exaggerations. In fact, both Russian and the U.S.-funded Georgian border troops have managed to reduce cross-border movements to an almost negligible trickle. The Chechen refugees are basically trapped in Pankisi. It is true that the armed fighters from time to time seek ways to break out; that a handful of them can infiltrate across the border occasionally; and that Pankisi is a den of organized crime. But such criminality affects Georgia itself, rather than Russia.

With no professional army or internal security forces to speak of, Georgia can't control Pankisi now. But it should be able to police the gorge by autumn, when the Train-and-Equip program will graduate the first batches of Georgian internal security troops. President Eduard Shevardnadze has announced plans to use those troops for policing Pankisi.

The Kremlin has at least four major reasons to want Georgia back under Russian control. First, Georgia is the linchpin country for the export of Caspian oil and gas directly to Western markets, as well as for the Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia transit corridor. The U.S., European Union countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan all strongly support these projects, which presupppose a Western-inclined Georgia. For its part, Moscow wants the lion's share of Caspian oil and gas to be diverted via Russia. One way to ensure that would be to force Georgia to change its orientation, or to fuel instability there.

Second, Moscow hopes to maintain its Soviet-era military bases in Georgia. Russia recently demanded a fourteen-year extension. This amounts to claiming a right of indefinite military presence. Conferring an "antiterrorist" mission on some of those troops looks like a pretext for prolonging their presence.

Third, Russia underwrites the armed secessionist enclaves in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to prevent Georgia from achieving national reconciliation and consolidation. Russian troops are stationed in both places as "peacekeepers." Adding a further hotbed of conflict, by casting Russian troops this time in an "anti-terrorist" role in Pankisi, could push Georgia another step toward disintegration.

A fourth factor has recently been described by the Clinton administration's former envoys, Strobe Talbott and Stephen Sestanovich, based on their experience with Kremlin leaders -- including Mr. Putin: The Russians' intense personal vindictiveness toward Mr. Shevardnadze. As Mr. Talbott recently remarked, "So many in the power structure in Moscow hated him, hated him, hated him. They blamed him for being a party to the destruction of the old Soviet Union. They regarded him as little better than a traitor.

"They detested the role he was playing in the Caucasus, standing up to Russia, knocking at NATO's door. That created the backdrop for what could have been a real catastrophe, particularly in 1999 and 2000 when the Chechen war heated up again and the Russians were just itching for a pretext to invade Georgia, which they actually did in bits and pieces."

Indeed, Russian ground troops and combat aircraft have repeatedly raided Georgian territory and airspace in the last two years, claiming to target "international terrorist camps," though without ever being able to claim reliably that they spotted any, much less hit them. In the last ten days alone, Russian planes conducted five bombing raids over unpopulated areas of Georgia. No casualties were reported. It all seems to be part of a war of nerves, a game of intimidation.

In Chechnya, the Russian military has already killed tens of thousands of civilians, maiming and uprooting an even greater number -- all in the name of "antiterrorism." No wonder Georgia wants to avoid a replay of such tragedies in Georgia itself.

Internationally, a Russian military intervention in Georgia would deal a severe setback to Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO cooperation. More significantly, the misuse of anti-terrorist rhetoric would also destroy any value of Russian political support for genuine anti-terrorist operations -- underway or planned -- by the United States and its allies in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Mr. Socor is a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation in Washington. This article originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal on August 9th, 2002.