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Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies
Washington, D.C. IASPS Policy Briefings: Oil in Geostrategic Perspective Date: November 3, 2002 Number: 2 |
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CIS Antiterrorism Center: Marking Time in Moscow, Refocusing on Bishkek by Vladimir Socor, IASPS Senior Fellow At the CIS summit in Chisinau (see IASPS Policy Briefing, no. 1, October 23), the eleven participating presidents adopted a political decision and a set of measures to develop a Central Asia branch of the CIS Antiterrorism Center (ATC). The branch, sited in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, is the first regional division to be spawned by the Moscow-based ATC. Other than the permanently neutral Turkmenistan, all CIS member countries participate in ATC activities, though participation can be sporadic or nominal. In announcing the summit’s decisions, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the ATC and its Bishkek branch are to focus on “countering the threats from the south,” such as Islamist militant groups and the “burgeoning” narcotics trade. Putin diplomatically omitted to say that Tajikistan, which of all the CIS countries has the heaviest presence of Russian army and border troops, is the principal avenue for the transport of drugs from Afghanistan via Central Asia to Russia. At Russia’s initiative, the summit decided to authorize and fund 60 staff slots -- up from the previously existing eight slots -- for intelligence officers to be deployed to the Bishkek headquarters. It is also in Bishkek that Russia has chosen to site the headquarters of the CIS Collective Security Treaty’s rapid deployment forces, which Moscow hopes to develop in Central Asia. All this appears inconsistent with the general recognition -- expressed also by Russian officials -- that U.S.-led antiterrorism operations in that region have largely removed the threats to Central Asia’s and Russia’s security. The focus on Bishkek seems, however, consistent with Russian intentions to check the American military presence in the region. Moscow recently moved to establish an air base near Bishkek at the dilapidated Kant airport, apparently because of its proximity to the strategic Manas airport, largest base of the U.S.-led coalition in Central Asia. Meanwhile, some leftist and pro-Moscow groups in Kyrgyzstan agitate -- in tandem with some Islamist groups -- against the American military presence there. Russia holds the command and 50 percent of the staff slots, as well as providing 50 percent of the budget, of both the Moscow-based ATC and its Central Asia branch. The other ten countries share the rest. Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Director -- currently Nikolai Patrushev -- is authorized to supervise the ATC. He also supervises “collective” anti-terrorist exercises in Central Asia, which are being held annually in April. This supervision arrangement implicitly treats CIS member countries as a field of action for Russia’s internal security agency. The ATC -- as well as the “collective” rapid-deployment force -- originates in a personal initiative of Putin at the CIS summit in January 2000 as acting president of Russia. He set about creating a Russian-led military bloc from the first hour of his presidency, and has since redoubled the efforts. However, Russia’s economic straits, and wariness on the part of most CIS member countries, have placed severe limits on ATC funding and personnel. A number of member countries have introduced statutory limits on ATC’s size, resources, and mandate, so as to deny it the authority to conduct covert operations on their national territories, or to interfere with these countries’ own intelligence services. For further safeguards, independent-minded countries have also entered reservations to the effect that involvement in joint activities is voluntary -- under the “interested party” principle -- rather than obligatory, and that their participation is subject to the respective national legislations. Thus far, the ATC in Moscow and its Bishkek branch have existed with skeleton staffs, and without real powers or a clear mission. They lack capabilities for intelligence-gathering or field operations. Judging from open-source references, the ATC is little more than a talking shop and bureaucratic conduit of politicized briefing papers for CIS countries’ leaderships, in preparation for summits. Meanwhile, the ATC is developing a data bank on international terrorist organizations that presumably target CIS member countries. The project seems redundant, in view of the meager resources available and its dependence on Russia’s own national intelligence-gathering capabilities. With an annual budget of just under 13 million rubles in 2001 and 26 million rubles (US $ 820,000) in 2002, the ATC seems little more than a symbol of Moscow’s aspiration to assemble a CIS political-military bloc under its leadership. The Chisinau summit approved a draft budget for 2003 which is said to be higher, and to shift resources from the Moscow center to its Bishkek-based branch under full Russian control. It is an open secret that Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan--and reportedly also Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan--prefer to rely on intelligence information supplied by the United States. The track record of that information for accuracy, depth, and technical sophistication is said to bear no comparison to information that Moscow can or does offer. Russia’s collection capabilities lag years behind those of the U.S. in terms of technological development, and the information it supplies tends often to be politically tainted. |