Division for Research in Strategy
Research and Analysis
Assembly of Turkish American Associations
Convention--Washington, DC
"Turkey's Role in the Caucasus and Central Asia" --- September 30, 1999.
Remarks by Paul Michael Wihbey, Strategic Fellow,
The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Washington DC.
Co-panelists:
· Amb. Mithat Balkan, Deputy Undersecretary, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
· Amb. John Wolf, Special Advisor to the President for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy.
Introduction:
As the global system lurches from the old order of the Cold War into a new and yet undefined system of global power there are increasing signs of an emerging pan-Eurasian, anti-NATO alliance system between Russia and China. Although not yet a formal military alliance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has already called this relationship "a strategic partnership." Both Russia and China's worldview is based on a multi-polar balance of power aimed at countering U.S. global dominance. Both countries have a broad set of converging strategic interests which include; (1) a stable and secular central Asia free of Islamic political regimes; (2) maintenance of the primacy of the UN Security Council; (3) opposition to U.S-driven theater missile defense systems; (4) opposition to NATO-type intervention in sovereign states on behalf of human rights and minority rights; (5) the perception of NATO as no longer just a defensive alliance (as in the Kosovo crisis).
Central Asia:
To this end on August 25, Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin along with the leaders of Kyrgystan, Kazakstan, and Tajikstan signed the Bishkek Declaration thereby enshrining some of the basic tenets of the new Russian/Chinese strategic alignment including cooperation on security issues, border control arrangements, and the affirmation of the principles of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty.
…. Already, under the strategic planning body entitled, Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation, co-chaired by the Russian First Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, Russia and China have made significant progress on several fronts including:
Compatibility of weapons systems
Sharing of intelligence
Increasing economic ties
Transfer of technology
Arms sales, which could include the Russian SSN-22 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, the SU-30 fighter, and Typhoon class nuclear ballistic submarines.…
These actions undermine the NATO-driven "Partnership for Peace Program" that was so evident during NATO's 50th anniversary celebrations. Such requests simply highlight the emerging issue-preeminence of regional security needs over economic development and political reform, and the need for Central Asian states to seek security guarantees from Russia.
In conclusion, as regards Central Asia, I believe Russia, with Chinese support, will take advantage of an emerging security vacuum to extend its influence back into the Southern Eurasian heartland. Other contributing factors to this strategic impulse, I suggest, involve the perception of neo-isolationist tendencies in the United States; an American unwillingness to accept further deployments (i.e. East Timor); a risk-averse U.S. Administration reluctant to take further foreign policy initiatives during the Presidential electoral-cycle, and; Moscow's exploitation of domestic Russian popular sentiment demanding retribution for recent terrorist bombings, and, the bombing campaign against Serbia.
The Caucasus:
This is a region of critical importance. Not withstanding the potential for conflict in the Pacific Rim, the Balkans, and between Israel and the Arabs, the Southern Caucasus/Northern Mesopotamia region is probably the most geo-strategically important piece of real estate in the world. If a radius of 300 miles is drawn at the point of convergence of the Iranian, Turkish and Armenian borders, just south of Yerevan, the territory thusly covered would include the following list of cross-border and internal conflicts that have occurred during the 1990's;
Cross Border Conflicts:
U.S. (multinational) versus Iraq
Armenia versus Azerbaijan
Major Insurgencies: PKK versus Turkey, Chechen versus Russia, Abkazia versus Georgia, Iraqi opposition (INC) versus Iraq (Saddam Hussein)
Three other flash points: Turkey /Syria; Turkey / Iran; and Azerbaijan/ Iran.
The situation is further compounded by major oil and gas deposits in Northern Iraq and Azerbaijan (Caspian Sea), as well as critically important and contentious pipeline routes such as Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa. The volatility of this region can be seen even today, with the deployment of Russian troops in Chechnya. Indeed the three states that make up the geostrategic unit of the South Caucasus,-- Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, two of whom share borders with Turkey, will be directly impacted by the advancement of Russian forces in Dagestan and Chechnya.
….Straddling the transit routes to the Supsa and Ceyhan oil terminals, Georgia is key to regional stability and prosperity. Not only is Georgia a strategic partner with Azerbaijan, but it maintains friendly and cordial relations with Armenia and Turkey. Consequently, any destabilization of Georgia would act as an incentive for the extension of the Russian sphere of influence to the very borders of Turkey. Combining such an eventuality with the already large presence of thousands of Russian troops in Armenia and Russian control over the North Caucasus leaves Azerbaijan vulnerable. Already flanked on its southern rim, by Russian ally Iran, Azerbaijan would find itself exposed and isolated, and susceptible to various forms of diplomatic pressure and extortion particularly over issues of energy distribution and production and development.A Georgian collapse creates the necessary conditions for a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power that under a worst case scenario would probably be characterized by; 1) a PKK destabilization of southeastern Turkey , which would then, 2) facilitate the development of an air and land corridor connecting the Russian forward deployment in the South Caucasus with northern Iraq, thereby; 3) extending Russian influence further into the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Such a future, could disrupt or entirely cut off the East-West energy transit corridor concepts that have been promoted by the United States and which stretch from the central Asian states through the Caucasus via Turkey into Europe.
Turkey's Role:
Within this context, the question arises as to Turkey's role in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey is not only the gate for the West into these regions, but Turkey is the indispensable power. The Central Asian and South Caucasus states do not have any great desire, to fall under Russian dominance, a Pan-Eurasian strategic alliance, or succumb to Islamic theocracy.But conditions today are not those of 1992 or 1996. These regions need to be elevated to a priority status by Western policy planners. Turkey can be the key stabilizer if it is given the appropriate diplomatic, political and financial support by countries like the U.S., Israel and Germany. Such a Turkish-led engagement needs to be part of an integrated and systematic effort at regional stability based on balance of power calculations using four key geostrategic instruments;
1) Energy Strategy: The Trans-Caspian pipeline project is the basis of collaboration between Turkey and the U.S. in the region. This integrated project has two parts, one being the Baku-Ceyhan and the other the Turkmenistan/Turkey/Europe natural gas pipeline. This project should be regarded with the highest strategic consideration, not only for Turkey, which is a major energy consumer, but for surrounding countries whose demand for energy is based as much on security of supply as pricing. These pipeline projects are the late 20th century's equivalent of the great transcontinental railway systems that secured nationhood for countries like the United States and Canada in the late 19th century. Continuing delay on the decisions relating to the East-West energy corridor only contributes to reducing the chances of such projects ever being built. While there are serious and legitimate questions relating to financing and market conditions, the crucial issue to the success of these routes, is attitudinal and tactical. Although risk can be calculated and reduced, it can never be totally eliminated. Competitors are emerging and the market is in a constant state of flux. I believe the approach needed to secure the Baku-Ceyhan project is best illustrated by how the Canadian government dealt with a somewhat analogous situation . In 1993, after the discovery of significant oil deposits off Newfoundland, the Canadian government stepped in to financially support (over $ 1.5 billion) exploration and development in a region of the country that has been in economic terms, seriously underdeveloped. Adopting a strategic attitude with due recognition of the risk factor, the Canadians, with their private sector partners, successfully developed the Hiberia oil field which is expected to produce almost 200,000 barrels of oil a day (10% of Kuwaiti production) by the end of the year. Hibernia's success has now prompted the Canadian government to sell its direct stake in the project to private sector interests…. 'Hibernia' represents the type of attitude and approach that the Turkish government ought to emulate with respect to Baku-Ceyhan. Baku-Ceyhan's importance is multi-dimensional with positive impact on regional security, economic development, and political stability.
2) The Turkish Model: Continued and upgraded promotion of the Turkish political and economic model of a secular, multi-party, market democracy. Turkish and U.S-based NGO's, policy and educational institutes, and multilateral organizations like GUUAM and OSCE can play an important role in adapting the Turkish experience to the particular socio-economic and political conditions in selected countries. The focus of such effort ought to be Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
3) The South Caucasus Cooperation Council: Turkey could play an important and pivotal role in maintaining the integrity of the South Caucasus by hosting (or co-hosting with the U.S.) the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, through the auspices of the South Caucasus Cooperation Council, during President Clinton's scheduled visit to Istanbul in November. Such an occasion would provide a long overdue platform for dialogue and cooperation and recast the issues of the South Caucasus within the attendant international and media attention that comes with a Presidential visit. Further, concerned private individuals, groups and private sector interests need to create voluntary mechanisms that actively promote peace, stability and economic development in parallel with, and support of, already existing bilateral and multilateral programs promoting free-market reforms, democracy and civil society, and other relevant issues.
4) Security Assistance: A Turkish-lead, U.S-supported program to provide security assistance to various Central Asian states, would certainly offer an alternative to the Russian option, or the politically unacceptable idea of direct U.S. engagement.
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