The
Israeli government is raising its deficit to 2.4
percent, and raising government spending to 54.4
percent of the GDP. It is funneling hundreds of
millions of dollars to anything it can think of. The
absurdities of increasing public expenditures can be
found in our August 21 NBN (“Unprecedented
Government Expenditures”). Now
let’s take a look at where all this money is going.
Plan
#1: Prime Minister Sharon himself will head a new
“Ministerial Committee on Aiding Failing
Industries.” NIS 200 million has immediately been
allocated to government guarantees for grants to
medium and small businesses that are failing.
Plan
#2: Also, a search will be conducted for 5,000 people
without education, who are unemployable, and they will
be located, rounded up
and given an education (cost: NIS 18 million).
Plan
#3: NIS 850 thousand will go this year alone for the
state to pay the salaries of factory workers who have
no work, so they can take unpaid [sic] vacations
rather than being let go.
Plan
#4: The cabinet approved make-work programs for adults
in the Antiquities Authority and National Parks
Authority. Labor Minister Benizri wants to employ 4000
people in this but Finance wants to think about the
number first.
Plan
# 5: The Employment Service will pay private
headhunting firms to find jobs for 2000 people.
Plan
#6: An another note, NIS 350 million will be taken
from the Ports Authority for defense needs. (At some
future point port fees will be reduced.) Incidentally,
this plan illustrates graphically the meaninglessness
of
decreasing US non-military aid while
concomitantly increasing military aid.
Plan
#7: On yet another note, two bankrupt plywood firms
are merging, the government will give them NIS 10
million of taxpayer money, the banks another 10
million (banks are state owned in Israel), and the
Histadrut will give 10 million. The Histadrut is
demanding, in turn, that duties be imposed on imported
plywood. The Ministry of Trade agrees.
Plan
[?] #8: Last but not least, the cabinet is getting two
new ministers, raising the number of cabinet members
to 28 and 12 deputy ministers, as the Central Party
receives its payoff for supporting the coalition. One
third of the 120 members of Knesset are no longer
functioning in the Knesset but are now part of the
executive branch.
All
the above have been collected from one day’s
newspaper, August 22, 2001.
Now
let us take a quick look at what the above means:
Plans
1 and 7 above mean the government is rewarding
inefficiency, ensuring employees of failing firms
never find worthwhile work elsewhere, allowing company
managers to increase their salaries while their firms
collapse, and teaching yet another generation of
Israelis that they do not have to be responsible for
their productivity, wages, or future. Or rather, that
the way to take responsibility for one’s employment,
food, religion, housing and even entertainment -
is to turn to the state and demand them.
Number
2 means the government, which has failed to educate
students and failed to retrain adults, will now once
again educate the people it has already failed to
educate….if it can find them first. Perhaps they
should hire the headhunters referred to in plan 5, to
hunt for these people. The inversion of setting
employment headhunters to the task of finding
unqualified people fits nicely with other aspects of
Israeli economic policy.
Speaking
of plan 5 above, this plan means the government admits
what IASPS proved beyond any doubt in Policy
Studies no. 36, on the State
Employment Service: that people who found jobs in
Israel did it through newspapers and private placement
firms, not through the service, and that the service
found jobs for almost no one who did come to it. Now
the government has decided that the service is going
to hire headhunters. So why does Israel need the
service? Simple: it provides jobs for 960 people, who
otherwise would have to be employed as per plan 4
above, in archaeological digs and parks.
Either
way, they are all make-work programs. Some people sit
in parks and others in Employment Service offices; no
one contributes anything to the GDP, but everyone gets
paid by the taxpayer.
We
skipped plan 3 above. This is pretty clear, but just
to be sure our readers understand there was no typo
above: The cabinet decision does indeed mean that
workers who have nothing to do because their factories
are not producing anything, will go on paid unpaid
vacations. In order to avoid calling them “fired”
or “let go” or “unemployed,” the government
has decided to call them “vacationers” and since
the factories have failed and cannot pay for these
vacations, the government will have
taxpayers fund the vacations. Otherwise, as we
have seen, these people too would have to be put to
work digging up old bones or working in parks (as per
plan 4), or in the Employment Service offices (plan
5). But there aren’t enough digs and parks, so the
answer is – vacations.
Now,
in addition to all the make-work programs, we have a
make-vacation program.
Plan
6 shows that the government ministers making these
decisions about spending taxpayer money have no idea
what they are doing and have never read any research
or dealt with reality. IASPS Policy
Studies no. 41
proved – again beyond any doubt – that one of
the major problems facing the Port Authority is that
any time local ports turned a profit, or came close to
it, the money was taken from the ports and spent
elsewhere. With no real investment being made in the
ports they have fallen to pieces. The real solution is
to take the ports out of government hands and
privatize them, allowing each port to compete with the
others and reinvest their profits so as to be able to
compete better. Privatization is of course out of the
question, especially since the fewer companies that
use the ports, and fewer boats that come, because of
the poor service and infrastructure, only move the
ports closer to plan 1 above, where they will get back
the NIS 350 million as state grants to failing
industries.
Plan
7 is another version of plan 1, in which the state
forces taxpayers to pay for companies that have no
economic reason for being there, other than to provide
jobs for people who otherwise would be employed by the
state in archaeological digs, parks, the Employment
Service or taking vacations (plans 1,3, 4, and 5). In
this case the taxpayer is likely to be forced to pay
twice, first for funding the merged company (which by
the way, has decided to keep both separate companies
functioning; no room for efficiency here) and then by
paying higher prices for all wood products in Israel
as duties raise the price of imports. (See an upcoming
IASPS Policy Studies on import duties.)
Plan
8, finally, is yet another example of make-work
programs in action. The cabinet saved the Employment
Service the worry of running after private headhunters
to find work for several members of a self-destructed
party with no public support, who obviously would be
out of work after the next elections. Notice to the
Employment Service as per plan 5 above: 2 down, 1998
to go. After all, had the cabinet not made these two
people ministers and given them cars and chauffeurs
and office staff, they might have had to go to work on
the archeological digs, in the parks, or in the
Employment Service or ports, or worse – to go on
vacations.
In
sum, we have an entire country designed from the start
to produce as little as possible as inefficiently as
possible, in which no one, from factory worker to
Cabinet minister, takes responsibility for his
decision or his life, and in which the government
confiscates the property of the few who are left
paying taxes in order to give others Potemkin
factories, archeology, Employment Service bureaus,
vacations, educations and cabinet posts.
Happy
days are here again.
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