The News Behind The News
November 22, 1999
The Realities of the Missile Defense QuestionIn an op-ed entitled, "The Arrow - Irresponsible Promises," which appeared in Ha'aretz on November 3, 1999, Reuven Pedahzur wrote that the Arrow will be ineffective against nuclear threat. He claims that deterrence is the only way to deal with the threat of ballistic nuclear missiles.
The author goes on to say that the development of a missile defense system will only encourage aggression and that the correct Israeli policy ought to be not to build a defense.
In fact, the existing anti-ballistic missile systems as well as those presently being developed in Israel and the US do not provide a solution to the growing missile threat from Iran, Iraq, Syria and other countries in the region. This threat includes 300 improved Scud B and Scud C missiles, Chinese Nodong missiles and Shihab 3 and 4's in the hands of the Iranians, tens of El-Hussein Scud missiles in Iraq, 50 CSS2 mobile missiles in Saudi Arabia and particularly 600 Scud B and C's, 36 SS-21 missiles and M-9 missiles in Syria. Israel is in fact more seriously threatened by ballistic missiles than any other nation in the world. This is also true of the number of missiles which could land simultaneously on the country as well as the type of warheads, which include conventional, biological, chemical and even nuclear. However, it is for the very reason that the missile defense systems currently in use do not provide a full answer to the threat posed by missiles that ballistic missiles have become a prominent, cheap and reliable component of rational military strategies in many countries, especially in the Third World, and not simply as weapons of mass destruction. Missiles have already been used in warfare (e.g. in the Gulf War), wherein there was no effective defense against them. Therefore, it should not be surprising that this modality is preferred by those very countries which have been purchasing and developing ballistic missiles without interruption.
Furthermore, the complexity of missile defense strategy is compounded by
raising several critical questions:
1. Which targets should be chosen in the event of an attack?
2. Why should an attack on these targets deter an aggressor?
3. What will deter us from deterring? What can Israel do if it is attacked with conventional warheads and is threatened by nuclear missiles should it choose to react?Although the Arrow is the best defense that Israel can produce on its own, it will only be effective against the type of missile attack experienced during the Gulf War, (i.e., a few Scud missiles with simple conventional warheads). The Arrow was not designed to intercept missiles traveling at more than 3 km per second (ballistic missiles can travel at speeds of 8 km per second and more) or missiles armed with biological, chemical or nuclear warheads. Given that only 250 Arrows will be manufactured by the year 2005, it will not even be effective against a large number of Scud missiles launched simultaneously. The placement of American anti-missile systems such as the PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability, THAAD and Navy Area Defense, would, together with the Arrow, provide a better defense for Israel, and to some extent for the US, against hundreds of simple missiles such as the Scud armed with conventional warheads. However, these systems were not designed to intercept missiles traveling at more than 3 km per second. For this reason, these systems are unable to intercept missiles with biological, chemical or nuclear warheads at sufficient distances from population centers in Israel (and/or the US). The reason for the limited effectiveness of American radar and missile defense systems is not technological, but rather lies in the decision of the American administration to abide by the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed between the US and the USSR. This treaty attempts to maintain the exact situation of deterrence and lack of defense against missile attack about which the author of the Ha'aretz article is speaking. The existence of this agreement essentially prevents the development of effective anti-ballistic missile defense systems. In other words, Israel and the U.S. put themselves and their citizenry in grave danger by adhering to a treaty entered into with a country (i.e., the former Soviet Union) that no longer exists.
Put simply, the correct strategic defense policy for Israel is not the abdication of all defense systems, but rather the full implementation of all defenses available. Israel would be permitted to take advantage of these American defense systems (including sophisticated ground- and space-based radar), all of which would significantly improve the Arrow's effectiveness and Israel's ability and to defend itself, if and when the US recognized that the ABM Treaty is no longer extant.
It is therefore in Israel's interest that the US develop missile defense systems that are as effective as technology will allow. In this manner, Israel, the US and various other countries would be able to defend their citizens against the continuing threat from ballistic missiles.
The News Behind the News Archive:
-The Realities of Missile Defense
-Israel, economic powerhouse?
-Gad Ze'evi and Bezek Stock